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The Survey sets forth in each installment those cases which are
deemed to make the most significant contribution to New York's procedural law. Due to limitations of space, however, many other less important, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included. While
few cases are exhaustively discussed, it is hoped that the Survey accomplishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the practitioner to significant developments in the procedural law of New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to direct the reader to those
specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance to him.
The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically treated in the
cases are listed under their respective titles.
PREFATORY NoTE

CPLR 7503(c): Ten-day period within which to apply for a stay of
arbitrationconstrued as a statute of limitations.
The advantages of "arbitral preclusion" as a protection against the
unwarranted interruption of arbitration are obvious; certain "threshold questions"' properly should be decided before proceedings before
the arbitrator have been commenced. However, where a ten-day preclusionary provision is construed as a statute of limitations, 2 thereby
foreclosing judicial review of such questions under all circumstances,
the "justifications" proffered in its defense should be carefully examined.
Under CPA 1459, arbitration was denominated a special proceeding to be initiated by service of a notice of intention to arbitrate. 3
The party so served was precluded from asserting that a valid agreement to arbitrate had not been made or complied with, unless notice
of an application to stay arbitration was served within ten days.4 As
an incident to a special proceeding, such applications were justifiably
'Under CPLR 7503(c) the threshold questions are:
(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate was made;
(2) whether it was complied with;
(3) whether the daim sought to be arbitrated is barred by the statute of
limitations.
See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 7503, commentary 488 (1963).
2 Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 208, 249 N.E.2d
477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969), af'g 31 App. Div. 2d 208, 295 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1st Dep't 1968).
3 Katz v. Burkin, 1 Misc. 2d 67, 146 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1955); 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 7503, supp. commentary 110 (1967); S. TRip', A. GuIDE TO MOTION PRAC7502.04.
TicE § 199 (rev. ed. 1949); 8 W. K. & M.
Although there appears to be a dispute as to when this special proceeding was
commenced under the CPA, courts frequently held that it was neither by a motion to
compel arbitration nor a motion to stay arbitration, but instead, by service of a notice
of intention to arbitrate. Fals, Arbitration Under the Civil Practice Law and Rules
in New York, 9 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1963).
4 CPA 1458(2).
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considered motions, 5 thus falling beyond the statutory proscription
that "[n]o court shall extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action." Accordingly, the ten-day rule was judiciously relaxed by the courts7 where no prejudice would result.8
Indeed, such applications were frequently made and often granted. 9
On the other hand, where an application related to the commencement of an action or special proceeding, the applicable statute of
limitations was determinative and the courts were powerless to grant
any time extensions.1 0
Adopting the substance of CPA 1458, CPLR 7503(c) provides
that a notice of intention to arbitrate which conforms to all the procedural requisites,1 including proper service, will prohibit the recipient from raising the threshold questions unless he "applies to
stay the arbitration within ten days." Significantly, however, it was
the intention of the draftsmen that arbitration would itself no longer
be considered a special proceeding.' 2 Consequently, unless made during the pendency of an action, applications are no longer considered
motions, 3 but rather are deemed independent applications for relief,
subject to the provisions governing the commencement of a special
proceeding.14
5 CPA 1459. The distinction between special proceedings and motions was recognized
in Lima v. Honeoye Falls Ry., 68 Hun 252, 253, 22 N.Y.S. 967, 968 (Gen. T. 5th Dep't

1893):
a motion is an application in a proceeding .. . upon which it depends for
jurisdiction; whereas a special proceeding is an independent prosecution of a
remedy, in which jurisdiction is obtained by original process.
0 CPA 99, now CPLR 201.
7 See CPA 98.
8 See, e.g., Grand Central Theatre, Inc. v. Moving Pictures Mach. Operators Union,
69 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1941), aJfJd, 263 App. Div. 989, 34 N.YS.2d 400
(Ist Dep't 1942).
9 7B McKINNzy's CPLR 7503, supp. commentary 123 (1967).
1OFor example, in Brown v. City of New York, 198 Misc. 147, 97 N.Y.S.2d 560
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950), it was held that the applicable four month statute of
limitations could not be tolled by providing in a timely order for service after the
expiration of the time limited by statute. See also Kram v. Cohen, 50 N.Y.S.2d 322
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1944).
It Under CPLR 7503(c) the notice of intention to arbitrate must contain the name
and address of the claimant and must specify the agreement pursuant to which arbitration is sought. Also, notice must be given the recipient that unless an application for
a stay of arbitration is made within ten days after such service, he will be precluded
from raising the threshold questions. Service of the notice of intention to arbitrate
may be in the same manner as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested.
12 See SEcoND REP. 134-35.
13 CPLR 7502(a) states: "A special proceeding shall be used to bring before the court
the first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy which is not made by
motion in a pending motion."
14 CPLR 304 provides that "a special proceeding is commenced and jurisdiction acquired by service of a notice of petition or order to show cause." For a discussion of
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This procedural innovation has been attended by a general
confusion among the courts and practitioners alike. Refusing to accede to the legislative intendment, both often mistakenly cling to
earlier practice. For example, in Beverly Cocktail Lounge, Inc. v.
Emerald Vending Machine, Inc.,15 the petitioner, relying upon CPLR
2103(b), '1 which pertains to the service of motions and other papers,
sought an additional three days within which to serve a notice of petition to stay arbitration. In denying this application, the court soundly
reasoned that since there was no action pending, the moving papers
should have been received by the respondent within ten days after
the notice of intention to arbitrate was mailed. Thus, Beverly was
an early indication of the initiatory-interlocutory papers distinction
engendered by CPLR 7503(c).
While in accord with the Beverly rationale that CPLR 2103(b)
was inapposite, the court in Finest Restaurant Corp. v. L&A Music
Co.' 7 opined that the ten-day period did not commence until the

postal authorities first delivered or attempted to deliver the notice of
intention to arbitrate. Accordingly, the petitioner in Manitt Construction Corp. v. J.S. Plumbing & Heating Corp.,'5 contended that
service upon him of the notice of intention to arbitrate was effected
on the date of receipt; thus, his notice of petition to stay arbitration
was timely inasmuch as it had been mailed nine days later. However,
the court held that service by the respondent was completed on the
date of mailing, in view of the statutory proviso that "service by mail
shall be completed upon deposit of the paper... in a post office. ....19

Nevertheless, service of the notice of petition for a stay of arbitration
was deemed proper in light of the three-day extension provided by
CPLR 2103(b).
The availability of a three-day extension has not been the only
source of confusion generated by CPLR 2103(b). The Beverly rationale
20
was implicitly reaffirmed in State-Wide Insurance Co. v. Lopez, where
the other pertinent sections of the CPLR (especially article four) see 8 W. K. & M.

7502.02.

15 45 Misc. 2d 376, 256 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965). See also The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 173 (1965).
16 CPLR 2103(b)(2) provides that papers to be served upon a party in a pending
action be served upon his attorney. It further states that: "Where a period of time
prescribed by law is measured from the service of a paper and service is by mail,
three days shall be added to the prescribed period."
1752 Misc. 2d 87, 275 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966). See also The Quarterly
Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 160 (1967).
1850 Misc. 2d 502, 270 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
19 CPLR 2103(b)(2).
20 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d Dep't 1968). See also The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JoHN'S L. Rv,532 (1969).
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a notice of petition to stay arbitration served upon an attorney was
invalidated. Cognizant of the legislative innovation, the court found
service defective insofar as process had not been served upon a party
to the "action." Concluding that it was without personal jurisdiction,
the court noted:
While CPLR 7503 subd. (c) provides for an alternate method of
service, it does not change the general rule that initial process
must be served upon the party over whom21jurisdiction is sought
to be acquired and not upon his attorney.
The efficacy of service upon an attorney was again questioned
in Bauer v. MVAIC. 22 Noting that the parties had incorporated the
rules of the American Arbitration Association providing for service
of papers upon a party or his attorney,23 the court reasoned that such,
in effect, constituted a designation of the attorney as an agent to receive initiatory process, and was, therefore, a valid predicate for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the principal. 24 By predicating its
decision upon principles of agency, the court seemingly recognized
the distinction drawn in Lopez between service of initiatory and interlocutory papers. Significantly, however, the court in Bauer, by way of
dictum, expressly rejected Lopez, and, in the process, cast serious doubt
upon its own initial reasoning. Indeed, the court concluded that the
same result was warranted by CPLR 7506, which permits service of
papers upon a party's attorney.25 However, inasmuch as this section
governs procedure once the parties are before the arbitrator, it should
not affect the "initiatory-interlocutory" distinction in effect when the
parties first seek judicial recognition of their grievance.26
2130 App. Div. 2d at 694, 291 N.YS.2d at 930.
22 31 App. Div. 2d 239, 296 N.Y.S.2d 675 (4th Dep't 1969). See also The Quarterly
Survey, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 158 (1969). Cf. Worth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 158
N.Y.L.. 98, Nov. 21, 1967, at 17, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
It should be noted that if an attorney is served, and an answer to the petition

is served without an objection to the defective service, the objection is waived. Appis v.
Employers fiab. Assurance Corp., 56 Misc. 2d 969, 290 N.YS.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968).
23 Rule 30 of the American Arbitration Association.

2431 App. Div. 2d at 243, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 679. Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1963).
25 The soundness of this "dictum" is also questioned in 7B McKamNEY's CPLR 7503,
supp. commentary 122 (1969).
28 Nor have the difficulties arising from the procedural changes made by article 75
been confined to applications for a stay of arbitration. Acceding to the legislative innovations, the court in 2166 Bronx Park East, Inc. v. Local 32E Bldg. Serv. Employees,
45 Misc. 2d 492, 257 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1965), dismissed petitioner's
application for failure to personally serve the respondent with its notice to compel
arbitration. Similarly, in Graffagnino v. MVAIC, 48 Misc. 2d 441, 264 N.Y.S.2d 483
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963), an application to confirm an arbitrator's award was denied
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The confusion occasioned by the procedural changes of article
75 and the dichotomy between motions and special proceedings recently led to extensive litigation concerning the propriety of a time
extension pursuant to CPLR 2004. In Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc.,27 the petitioner received a notice of intention to arbitrate on April 2, 1968. The notice conformed to the
procedural mandates of CPLR 7503(c), stating that petitioner would
be precluded from asserting that a valid arbitration agreement had
not been made or complied with, or from asserting the bar of a time
limitation in court, unless application was made for a stay of arbitration within ten days. On April 11, 1968, a supreme court justice
signed an order requiring the respondent to show cause why the
arbitration should not be stayed and directing that service be effected
on or before April 18. Accordingly, respondent was served on April
18, sixteen days after petitioner received the original notice. Having
complied with the court order, petitioner contended that service was
timely and proper. The respondent, however, argued that the application was time-barred, and the Supreme Court, New York County,
28
granted its cross-motion to compel arbitration.
On appeal, the petitioner asserted that there had not been an
agreement to arbitrate. Moreover, it was contended that the statute
did not require service within ten days, and, if it did, an extension
of time under CPLR 2004 should be allowed since no prejudice had
been shown. Petitioner further reasoned that it had acted in good
faith, attempted to comply with the statute, and had followed the
supreme court directive. 29 In support of its position that service need
not be made within ten days, the petitioner maintained:
There is a notable exception to the rule that actions and
proceedings are commenced when applicable papers are served, the

notable exception being the commencement of an action or proceeding upon the issuance of a provisional remedy.80
without prejudice because service was not effectuated in the manner provided in petitioner's order to show cause. The fact that the application was the first one arising
out of an arbitrable controversy was controlling.
27 31 App. Div. 2d 208, 295 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Ist Dep't 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 208, 249
N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969).
28 158 N.Y.L.J. 124, June 26, 1968, at 2, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
29 Brief for Appellant at 4, Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stllhwater Worsted Mills, Inc.,
31 App. Div. 2d 208, 259 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1st Dep't 1968).
SO Id. at 8, citing Schram v. Keane, 279 N.Y. 227, 18 N.E.2d 136 (1938). The appellant in Logan attempted to compare the order to show cause staying any further arbitration with a provisional remedy. Schram (which dealt with the tolling of a statute of
limitations) and similar deisions are largely responsible for the enactment of CPLR
203(b)(3) which, like Schram, states that the procurement of a provisional remedy will give
the court conditional jurisdiction until service is made in compliance with a court order.
Thus, if a stay of arbitration could be likened to a provisional remedy, the service
of the order to show cause within the time set would have tolled the statute of limitations.
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In other words, petitioner argued that the order to show cause, "was
more than a mere substitute for the ordinary notice of petition." 31
In affirming the order of special term, the appellate division refused to consider the merits of the petitioner's claim. Instead, the
court concerned itself with whether there had been compliance with
CPLR 7503(c). Reading CPLR 7502 and CPLR 304 in conjunction,
the court concluded that the requisite special proceeding must be
commenced by service within ten days. Construing the ten-day period
as a statute of limitations, the court was compelled to view the petitioner's failure to effect service within the prescribed time as fatal
to his claim since CPLR 201 prohibits an extension of the time provided by law for the commencement of an action.8 2 In support of
this interpretation, the court noted that statutes should be construed
and applied so as to effect the purpose for which they were enacted.33
And, as article 75 was enacted to expedite the settlement of disputes,3 4
an extension of time for an application to stay arbitration would presumably frustrate the intent behind that article.3 5 The Court of Appeals adopted this reasoning in a memorandum affirmance, Chief
Judge Fuld and Judge Burke dissenting. 6
While well within the literal construction of CPLR 7503(c), Logan is predicated upon an unarticulated yet clearly present judicial
belief that ten days provides sufficient time within which to commence
a special proceeding for at least two reasons: the moving papers may
be served quickly by registered or certified mail, and CPLR 7503(c)
affords sufficient procedural safeguards to the party served. Indeed, if
a notice of intention to arbitrate does not comply with the CPLR, the
recipient will not be precluded from raising the "threshold questions"
by an application for a stay of arbitration after the ten-day period has
elapsed, 37 or by an application to vacate an arbitrator's award. 38 In

short, "the validity of the ten-day limitation depends upon the sufficiency of the notice." 39 And, applications have been entertained after
81 Id.
82
S3

The word "action" includes a spedal proceeding. CPLR 105(b).
See N.Y. STATUTE §§ 92, 96 (MCIciNNEY 1942).

34 Mole v. Queen Ins. Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 1, 217 N.Y.S.2d 830 (4th Dep't 1961).
35 See The BiannualSurvey, 39 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 239 (1964).
3624 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E2d 477, 80 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969). Accordingly, it must be
assumed that both the appellate division and the Court of Appeals considered the procurement of an order to show cause as an alternative to a notice of petition- not as a
provisional remedy.
37 See Napolitano v. MVAIC, 26 App. Div. 2d 757, 272 N.Y.S.2d 220 (3d Dep't 1966).
88 CPLR 7511(b)(2).
39 Hesslein & Co. v. Greenfield, 281 N.Y.2d 26, 31, 22 N..
2d 149, 151 (1939).
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the ten-day period had expired where the notice was served by ordinary
41
mail,40 or where the petitioner had failed to include his address,
or where the demand did not specify the subject matter in dispute. 42
Notwithstanding these procedural safeguards, the situation may
well develop wherein the practitioner is unable to make an application
for a stay of arbitration within ten days. The question thus arises as to
whether all applications made after the ten-day period has elapsed
must be dismissed as time-barred. It appears that such a construction
would not only contravene the spirit of the CPLR, 4 3 but is also untenable in view of the functional purposes of preclusion. A comparison of the policies sought to be effectuated by preclusion as opposed
to those underlying a statute of limitations may be helpful. The latter
is generally justified on the grounds that it is designed "to spare the
courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put
to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost." 44 On the other hand, the tenday caveat is intended to preclude consideration of the threshold
45
questions subsequent to the commencement of the arbitral process.
Concededly, the latter objective is valid since these issues should be
decided beforehand. But, during the interim between service of a
notice of intention to arbitrate and the institution of proceedings before an arbitrator should not applications be entertained despite the
expiration of the ten-day period when special circumstances are evident? Could it be seriously argued that "the obscuring effects of time"
have made these claims "stale"? Moreover, in view of the unique purposes attached to both a statute of limitations and the ten-day preclusion caveat, it would appear that in the context of CPLR 201 the word
"action" is not intended to encompass those "special proceedings" involving an application for a stay of arbitration. 46 To hold otherwise
would be to presuppose that the preclusion caveat is a statute of limitations. Considering the purposes usually attached to each, the fact that
40 Napolitano v. MVAIC, 26 App. Div. 2d 757, 272 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sd Dep't 1966).

41 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neithardt, 24 App. Div. 2d 941. 265 N.Y.S.2d 128 (lst Dep't 1965).
42 Unipak Aviation Corp. v. Mantell, 20 Misc. 2d 1078, 196 N.YS.2d 126 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1959).
43 Construction - CPLR 104 provides that: "The civil practice law and rules shall
be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
civil judicial proceeding."
44 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1944). See also Gregoire v. G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45, 86 N.Y.S.2d-(1948).
45 FOURTH REP. A-244.
46 CPLR 105(a) states that "[u]nless the context requires otherwise, the definitions in
this section apply to the civil practice law and rules." CPLR 105(b) provides that the
word "action" includes a special proceeding.
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the legislature has not affirmatively defined it as such, 47 and that ten
48
days would be the shortest limitation period provided in the CPLR,
there appears little reason for denying extensions in the sound discretion of the court.
This flexible approach is supported by an analysis of the decision
in Logan. Obviously, when a party is compelled to submit a dispute
to arbitration, he is confronted by a system of procedural and substantive law which differs with that enforced in the courts. 49 Furthermore,
although the situation in Logan is comparable to one arising from an
irregularity in the application, the result is not a dismissal without
prejudice, permitting a renewed application. 0 On the contrary, such a
decision is in effect a final determination foreclosing judicial scrutiny
47 See

2 CARMODY-WArr 2d, CYCLOPEDIA or NEW YoRK PRAcrcE § 13:3 (1965).
48 There are other "short" periods of time within which a party must complete an
act. However, there is inherent justification for these short periods. For example, under

the election law, proceedings to attack a nominating petition or to object to a primary
election must be commenced within twenty days of the alleged infraction. N.Y. ELac.

LAw § 380 (McKinney 1964). However, such provisions are not unreasonable because they
are inextricably connected with the public interest.
Also, the General Municipal Law, mandates that a notice of claim be filed within
90 days of an alleged injury. N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAw § 50-e (McKinney 1965). Filing the
notice is a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action against various public
corporations. However, this requirement is justified on the ground that when a state
waives its sovereign immunity it may attach whatever condition it desires before a party
will have the right to bring an action.
As witnessed in Logan, the ten-day preclusion caveat contained in CPLR 7503(c)
is usually justified on the ground that it expedites arbitration. Accordingly, it is maintained that to permit an application for a stay of arbitration after the ten days have
elapsed would result in a great deal of uncertainty as to the validity of the arbitration
proceedings. This viewpoint presupposes that preclusion always achieves the desired goals
and overlooks the fact that a decision denying a stay of arbitration is appealable, and,
therefore, the process of arbitration can be held in abeyance for months. Secondly, an
unwilling party to an arbitration proceeding can otherwise prolong arbitration appreciatively. See Costikyan, Some Observations on Arbitration, 151 N.Y.LJ. 40, Feb. 27, 1964,
at 1, col. 3.
40 The argument that the parties have waived certain rights by their agreement to

arbitrate is circular in these premises because it is just such a question (viz., whether
a valid agreement to arbitrate exists) that the courts are being called upon to decide.

When a party does agree to arbitrate, he subjects himself to procedures peculiar to
the arbitral process. Among other things, the arbitrators are not bound by rules of
substantive law. 2 CARMODY-WAr 2d, CYCLOPEDIA or NEw YoRK PRAacrIcE § 141:2 (1965).
In addition, the availability of pretrial examinations is the exception rather than the rule
and the hearings are not conducted under the usual evidentiary rules. H. WAc-rmr.L,
NEv YoRK PRAcricE UNmRTim CPLR 863 (2d ed. 1966).
GOSee, e.g., Graffagnino v. MVAIC, 48 Misc. 2d 441, 264 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1965), wherein petitioner's application to confirm an arbitrator's award was dismissed without prejudice due to improper service.
It should be noted that CPLR 7510 has been held to be a one year statute of
limitations. Belli v. Matthew Bender & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 72, 263 N.Y.S.2d 846
(Ist Dep't 1965). However, the decision was grounded in CPLR 215(5) rather than § 7510
itself because the latter section was not in specific terms a statute of limitations.
However, even if improperly made, an application to confirm an arbitrator's award made
within one year would toll the statute of limitations. CPLR 205(a).
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of the "threshold questions." 51 Does this situation conform to the
liberal construction mandated by the CPLR? Justice Steuer's dissenting
52
opinion in Logan would clearly warrant a negative inference.
The difficulties inherent in Logan are demonstrated by General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Cerretto,53 where the parties

by stipulation had agreed upon an extension of the ten-day period.
Although the agreement was executed after service of petitioner's
notice of intention to arbitrate, it was nevertheless set aside as ineffective on the ground that "if the court is prevented from extending the
time, certainly an attorney for either party should not be permitted

to waive his client's rights by agreeing to enlarge the period prescribed
by law."5 4 This holding directly contravenes section 17-103(1) of the
General Obligations Law5 5 which provides that parties may agree not
to plead the statute of limitations if the promise is made after the
cause of action accrues. Moreover, even if it were maintained that the

written stipulation was procedurally ineffective, the court could have
reached a similar result via section 17-103(4)(b), 51 New York's codifica51 CPLR 7511, which concerns vacating or modifying an award, does not make provision for an application (by one who has been served with a notice of intention to
arbitrate) to raise the threshold issues. CPLR 7502(b) allows the arbitrators at their sole
discretion to entertain the issue of a limitation of time. In short, neither section
provides for the raising of the question as to whether a valid agreement has been made
or complied with after a party has failed to apply within ten days.
Not only is a consideration of the threshold questions prohibited, but the court is
also limited in the extent to which it can review the arbitrator's award. CPLR 7511(b)(1);
see H. WAcHELL, NEW YoRi PRhaCsCE UNDER THE CPLR 363 (2d ed. 1966). For an
illustration of the independence of the arbitrator, see Torano v. MVAIC, 15 N.Y.2d 882,
206 N.E.2d 353, 258 N.YS.2d 418 (1965). In that case claimant's husband, sole support of
herself and two children, was killed in a hit and run accident. The arbitrator arrived
at a $500 award. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the inadequacy of the
award, since it is not a ground specified in the statute, was not reviewable.
52 Justice Steuer phrased his dissent thusly:
Of all the statutes enacted and in force it is impossible to designate one
which is more peculiarly the province of the lawyer than the CPLR. Written
by lawyers, its directions are for all practical purposes directed to them, and
to them alone. It is submitted that no lawyer regards the institution of an
action or a special proceeding as an "application." One "applies" to the court
but not to the opposing party.
30 App. Div. 2d at 212, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 858. Cf. Justice Valente's dissenting opinion in
Chariot Textiles Corp. v. Wallalancit Textiles Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 762, 763, 250
N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (Ist Dep't 1964):
Since the desirability and usefulness of consolidation are no longer open
to question, power to effect such ends should not be lightly disclaimed. Particularly is that true where an act such as the CPLR - intended to remove many
of the technicalities of practice and pleading and is to be liberally construed
the asserted basis for ouster of jurisdiction.
-is
In the latter case, the Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of Judge Valente's dissenting opinion. 18 N.Y.2d 795, 221 N.E.2d 914, 275 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1966).
53 60 Misc. 2d 216, 303 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969) (mem.).
54 Id. at 218, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
55 N.Y. GEN. OBLirATIONs LAW § 17-103 (McKinney 1964).
5 N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 17-103(4)(b) (McKinney 1964). This subsection
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don of the principle of substantive law by which a party may be estopped from pleading the statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION

An overview of Logan indicates that so literal a construction of
CPLR 7503(c) may often be unduly oppressive. Although ten days is
usually enough time within which to make an application for a stay of
arbitration, should a situation arise where an application cannot be
made because of special circumstances and no prejudice would result
from a time extension, courts are presently powerless to grant relief.
The subsection would seem to mandate a more flexible interpretation:
one that would grant judicial relief based upon the relative exigencies
present in a given case.57 Even if it were hypothesized that the facts presented in Logan did not warrant such liberality, the Court should have
disclosed this factor. Moreover, in view of the confusion generated
by lower courts in their interpretation of article 75, Logan could have
been given prospective application 58 only, thereby achieving two objectives: the Court could have obtained a decision which it obviously
felt constrained to reach, and the legal profession would have been "on
notice" that a time extension thereafter would be unavailable.
While speculation as to the ultimate judicial reaction to Logan
is at best conjectural, most recent progeny intimate blind adherence.5 9
Unfortunately, while the case removed many of the pitfalls to which
an unwary practitioner could conceivably be exposed,6 0 it also injected the possibility of its own self-perpetuation in the lower courts.
That is, with Logan in its arsenal, courts can summarily dispose of
applications to stay arbitration without ever reaching the threshold
provides that the enactment of § 17-103 into law "does not affect the power of the court

to find that by reason of conduct of the party to be charged it is inequitable to permit
him to interpose the defense of the statute of limitation." See also Robinson v. City of
New York, 24 App. Div. 2d 260, 265 N.YS.2d 566 (lst Dep't 1965).
57Such an approach could recognize special circumstances as they occur and, yet,
maintain the general purpose of preclusion, viz., to insure that the arbitral process is not
unduly hindered. Thus, preclusion would remain as a useful device, especially in cases
where laches is evident. See, e.g., Langemyr v. Campbell, 23 App. Div. 2d 371, 261
N.Y.S.2d 500 (2d Dep't 1965) (declaratory judgment action commenced six months after
receipt of notice of intention to arbitrate was not available in lieu of an application
for a stay of arbitration; petitioner had earlier abandoned his application for a stay of
arbitration).
Ls Cf. Hersh v. Homes Ins. Co., 284 App. Div. 428, 131 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1st Dep't 1954).
50 See, e.g., Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent DePaul v. Boegel, 32 App. Div. 2d 818,
302 N.Y&.2d 462 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.) (extension of time under CPLR 2004 denied
primarily on authority of Logan).
6OSee, e.g., Monarch Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 32 App. Div. 2d 819, 302 N.Y.S.2d 432
(2d Dep't 1969). Relying on Logan the court experienced none of the difficulties evident
in the earlier cases in holding the time extension under CPLR 2103(b) inapplicable.
See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
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questions or the underlying equities. Inasmuch as the present approach appears unsatisfactory, two alternatives are submitted: (1) the
legislature "affirm" Logan and, realizing its implications, extend the
time period within which to commence the special proceeding; or,
(2) the Court seize upon the earliest opportunity to distinguish Logan
on its facts.
NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTION

Art. 6, § 19(f): Status of litigation in supreme court affected by proceedings in New York City Civil Court even though civil court transferred the action because it lacked jurisdiction.
The mandatory transfer provision contained in article 6, section
19(f) of the state constitution 6' is self-executing; 6 2 hence, the burden
of effectuating the intent behind that section falls upon the judiciary.
And, although the language of the section is explicit, delicate questions of interpretation surround its implementation. 3 For example,
in Kemper v. TransamericaInsurance Co.,64 the New York City Civil
Court was confronted with the problem of determining the effect, if
any, of previous proceedings in the civil court upon the status of the
litigation in the supreme court.
In Kemper, the defendant, already in default, moved in the New
York City Civil Court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
plaintiff's claim exceeded the court's monetary jurisdiction. Recognizing the validity of the defendant's assertion, 65 the court, nevertheless,
denied the motion; instead, it directed, sua sponte, that the action
be transferred to the supreme court.
Concerning the stage at which the action should reach the supreme court, the civil court held that despite the absence of legislative
guidance the status of the case should be no different than if it had
61N.Y. CoNsr. art. 6, § 19(0 (1962) provides that the court "shall transfer to the
supreme court . . . any action . . . over which the said courts for the city of New York
have no jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.)
62 Cf. Frankel Assoc., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 607, 257 N.Y.S.2d
555 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
63 Many of the problems of construction arise because the CPLR was drafted prior
to the judiciary article of the state constitution, and, in several aspects, they are inconsistent. 7B MCKINEY'S CPLR 325, commentary 622-23 (1963). Nevertheless, the
constitutional provisions take precedence over the CPLR. Garland v. Raunheim, 29 App.

Div. 2d 383, 288 N.Y.S.2d 417 (Ist Dep't 1968).
64 61 Misc. 2d 7, 304 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
65 Although the complaint in Kemper stated several causes of action, the court held
that it alleged one primary right of the plaintiff and one wrong by the defendant.
Therefore, the court viewed the complaint as stating one cause of action which exceeded its jurisdiction.

